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ABSTRACT
This paper re—examines the effect of devaluation under capital—account
restrictions, adding to traditional formulations the seemingly minor (but
realistic) assumption that central—bank reserves earn interest. The extra
assumption has important implications.En an intertemporal model, devalua—
tion is no longer neutral in the long run as it is in the literature on
the monetary approach to the balance of payments. Further, the economy
may possess multiple stationary states, some of them unstable.
The analysis confirms, however, that even large devaluations must
improve the balance of payments if the economy is initially at a stable
stationary position. A by—product of the analysis is a pricing formula
for the financial exchange rate in a dual exchange rate system. That
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A number of controversies in international monetary economics have cen-
tered on the analysis of devaluation. Ikst recently, accounts of the mone-
tary approach to the balance of payments have used the devaluation example
to illustrate some basic insights of that view (see Mundell [1971]
Dornbusch [19731 ,andFrenkel and Mussa [1984]). A typical exposition
assumes that there is no private international capital mobility, so that
the aggregate real money stock is predetermined. Devaluation, by instan-
taneously reducing real balances, leads to a flow excess demand for money,
a temporary balance—of—payments surplus, but no change in the economy's
unique long—run real equilibrium. The result is intuitively appealing, as
it conforms to the principle that changes in nominal variables should have
no permanent real effects.
This paper re—evaluates the foregoing predictions about devaluation in
a simple optimizing model of an economy with capital controls. Unlike the
models used to illustrate the monetary approach, the model used here
recognizes that central—bank foreign reserves generally earn interest.
This modification leads to two important conclusions. First, devaluation
must lead to an increase in the economy's long—run consumption and real
balances, and thus is nonneutral.Second, the economy may have multiple
steady states, some of them unstable, even when all goods are normal.
In an optimizing modelsimilar to the one employed here, Calvo [1981]
has obtained the monetary—approach conclusion that devaluation is asymp-
totically neutral when central—hank reserves earn no interest and there is
no private capital mohi lity. As I show below, however, devaluation is not
in general neutral w'hen capT tal is mobile unless central—hank reserves earn—2—
interest at the market rate. The assumption that reserves earn interest
would therefore seem to be a natural one to make in an investigation of the
effects of devaluation under capital controls. While the central bank's
reserve transactions do enable the public to engage in net external saving
and dissaving under capital immobility, however, the interest rate per-
ceived by the public can differ from the one available to the bank. This
distortion lies behind the economy's peculiarities, and I model the
domestic real interest rate explicitly by introducing a dual foreign
exchange rate for financial transactions. A characterization of the dual
exchange rate and its dynamic behavior is a by—product of the analysis.'
The paper is organized as follows.
Section I studies the benchmark case of perfect capital mobility,
showing that under certain idealized conditions (including interest—bearing
official reserves), devaluation is fully neutral, even in the short run.
This result was demonstrated previously in Obstfeld [1981} under assump-
tions about individual preferences somewhat different from those made below.
Section II modifies the previous section's model by adding an official
prohibition on private capital movements. Individuals are still allowed to
hold a fixed pool of "financial foreign exchange, and the price of this
asset in terms of consumption defines a floating dual exchange rate. It is
shown that the equilibrium dual exchange rate is given by a standard
consumption—based asset pricing formula.
Section III studies the dynamics of the resulting model. Because the
return to national saving, the world interest rate, differs from the
domesticinterest rate motivating private saving decisions, the usual
saddle—path stability condition characterizing steady states of optimizing—3—
models need not hold. Further, there may exist several long—run
equilibria, some saddle—path stable and some entirely unstable.
Section IV analyzes the effect of a permanent, unanticipated deva-
luation on an economy initially at a stable long—run equilibrium.
Devaluation always leads to a balance—of—payments surplus; but because the
counterpart of this surplus is an increasing stock of official interest—
bearing reserves, the economy's new long—run position is characterized by a
level of national income higher than that prevailing initially. It follows
that when capital is immobile, devaluation generally has real effects both
in the short and long runs.
Concluding remarks are contained in Section V. An appendix deals with
some technical matters.
I. Capital Mobility and the Neutrality of Devaluation
This section develops a simple optimizing model with capital mobiliity
in which an unanticipated devaluation is fully neutral. As is discussed
below, some idealized features of the economy described guarantee this
neutrality. But the model is a useful benchmark for the discussion to
follow, which shows how the imposition of capital controls renders deva-
luation nonneutral in the short and long runs even in a frictionless setting.
Residents of the economy consume a single perishable consumption good
that may be freely inported or exported. Domestic output of the good is
constant at level y. The only two assets held by residents are a domestic
moneynot held by foreigners and an internationally traded consol—type bond
paying r units of the consunption good per unit time in perpetuity. The
economy is small inthe world'smarketsfor goods andbonds:both the—4--
foreign—currency price of the consumption good, P, and the world real
bond price, q*, are exogenous, and assumed fixed. In the model of this
section, there are no official restrictions on international capital move-
ments. An implication is that the real rate of interest, r/q*, is
given by the world capital market and constant.
A representative immortal consumer inhabits the economy. The
consumer's instantaneous utility is a function of consumption, c, and real
balance holdings, m, where the latter variable is defined as nominal money
holdings, M, divided by the domestic—currency price of consumption, P.
Maximization of the intertemporal welfare criterion
V =5 u(c,m)exP(_ót)dt (1)
0
is the consumer's goal.2 The parameteris a fixed subjective rate of
time preference, assumed in this section to equal the world real interest
rate p*.3 The strictly concave instantaneous utility function satisfies
u u—uu < 0, u u—uu < 0, so that both goods are normal. cmmmcm mccccm
To simplify the subsequent discussion of the central hank's balance
sheet, I consider the case in which the exchange rate (the domestic—
currency price of foreign exchange) is fixed except for discrete, t1nantici—
pated devaluations. As will he evident, the analysis would easily
generalize to an economy in whichtheexchange rate, though pegged at each
instant, s expected to move continuously over time (see Calvo [19811 or
Obstfeld [1981]). Under a fixed exchange rate F, goods—market arbitrage
guarantees that P equals FP, andbecauseP is fixed, the expected
domesticinflationrate is zero. The opportunity cost of holding moneyis—5—





whereb0 is the (net) number of bonds issued to the domestic private sector
by foreigners up to (and including) time 0 and r represents expected real
time—t transfer paents from the government.4
The central bank holds as foreign reserves consols issued by
foreigners. Since the domestic public does not hold foreign currency ——
whichyields neither utility nor interest ——thecentral hank can hold the
exchange rate constant at E by exchanging foreign bonds for home money when-
ever there is excess demand or supply in the home money market. Earnings
on central—bank foreign reserves are turned over to the government and
other central—bank assets earn no interest. If government consumption
is zero, the consolidated public—sector budget constraint is
Tt =rf
(3)
where f devotes the central bank's stock of foreign reserves.
The central—bank balance sheet links official foreign reserve holdings
to the (high—powered) domestic money stock, m. Assume for simplicity (and
without loss of generality) that no devaluations or changes in q* have
occurred in the past. As long as no devaluations do occur, the real money
stock is given by
mq*f+ (D0/P) (4)
for t ) 0, where P0 (assuned constant) is the nominal supply of domestic
credit .—6—
The assumption that central—bank foreign assets earn interest plays a
key role in the analysis, and will he discussed further below. It should
be noted now, however, that the assumption is certainly more realistic than
the alternative hypothesis that the central hank willingly forgoes interest
6 income.
Tosolve the individual's problem, form the Lagrangian expression
L =f u(c,m)exp(_t)dt+ X0[m0+qb0+(y/p)+fTexp(_Pt)dt_





forall t.Notethat (6) and (7) imply that equilibrium c and m must
remain constant over time. To derive the unique shadow value of wealth
associated with an optimal individual program, use (6) and (7) to express
desired consumption and real balances as explicit functions of A0 and :
=c(X0,p*),
=m(X0,p*).Then A0 allows the lifetime budget
constraint (2) to hold with equaliity, and thus isthesolution to
[c(A0,p*)/p*](Ap,p*) =m0+qb0+(y/p)+fTexp(_pt)dt. (8)
0
The model cannot be closed
futuregovernment transfers is
equilibrium is assumed to be a
the equilibrium expected future
of official reserves {f0 =
(3),Tt
=rf,holds forall t.
until the process generating expectatons of
specified. For this purpose the economy's
perfect foresight equilibrium, in the sense that




As noted above, the money market is—7--
brought into equilibrium at each instant through official foreign exchange
intervention ——ineffect, exchanges of foreign bonds between the domestic
public and central bank. Real balances m may therefore jump at a point In
time.It is important to remember, though, that the sumb + f of net
claims on foreigners held by the economy as a whole is a predetermined or
non—jumping variable that can change only over time through current account
deficits and surpluses. Instantaneous domestic portfolio adjustment can
alter the money supply, but it cannot result in a transfer of real resour-
ces between countries.
Substitution of (3) and (4) into (8) with =m(A0, ck) for t > Q
yields the equation
-q*(b+f)+(y/p*) (9)
When no devaluation is expected, the equilibrium shadow price of wealth
is the solution to (9) ,andcan be expressed as a function of predetermined
or exogenous variables only:
=
A0(b0+f0,y,p). (10)
(A0 is unique because, as is easily verified, c < 0 under the normality
assumptions.) Since domestic money is a nontraded asset, the economy's
discounted planned consumption cannot in equilibrium exceed the capftalized
value of its real resources. The equilibrium A0 may be interpreted as the
unique shadow price of wealth consistent with both individual optimality
and this aggregate intertemporal constraint.
The effects of an unanticipated devaluation at time 0 (an increase in
the exchange rate to F' from F) may now be analyzed. The devaluation occa—
sions an incipient excess demand for domestic real balances, but this is
eUminated immediately as rcsidents sell the central hankforeign bondsto—8—
rebuild their aoney holdings. This process of portfolio readjustment remo-
ves foreign claims from private ownership and places then under government
ownership, hut leaves the sum b0+ f0unaltered. Equation (10) therefore
showsthat X0 ——andthus consumption and real balances ——iSunchanged.
&gents can instantaneously restore their real balances yet maintain their
previous consumption level because the foreign interest payments they
sacrifice to rebuild their money holdings are [by (3)] returned to them in
the form of higher transfers. Essentially for this reason, devaluation is
fully neutral.
For future reference,itis useful to derive the effect on the central—
bank balance—sheet relation (4) of the unantLcipated devaluation at time 0.
Let c(F' —E)/E'denote the percentage devaluation. After devaluation,
butbefore private portfolio readjustment has occurred, the realmoney
supply is given, not by (4), but by
q*f0 + (D0/P)_r[q*f0+(D0/p)], (ii)
provided the central hank does not monetize the nominal capital gains on
7 its foreign reserves. The devaluation thus causes an incipient reduction
in real money, but as we have seen, an immediate real private capital
inflow equal to c[q*f0 + (D0/p)] prevents such a reduction fromoccurring
in equilibrium. Because Am.=q Af if no further devaluationsoccur, the
real central—hank balance sheet relation becomes
q*f+(D0/p)_c[q*f0+(D/p)] (12)
in future periods. Real money is then equal to real foreign reserves plus
real domestic credit minus an adjustment reflecting the fact that official—9—
** reservespurchased up to time 0 were purchased at a money price EP q lower
*
thanthe current price E'P q
It was observed earlier that certain idealized features of the present
economy are necessary in order that devaluation be neutral in the short
run.If central bank reserves do not earn interest, the capital inflow
following devaluation causes a fall in national income and in consumption
(Frenkel and Rodriguez [1975]); devaluation essentially acts as a tax in
this case.If bonds are claims to nominal payments in different curren-
cies, devaluation can alter domestic wealth by changing the real value of
the net external debt (Boyer [1977] and Lapan and Enders [1978]). If the
economy is inhabited by overlapping generations with finite horizons, deva-
luation has real effects if it leads to redistribution of income across
generations. Abstraction from these conventional sources of nonneutrality
is necessary in order to isolate conceptually the impact of capital
controls.
II. Capital Controls and the Financial Exchange Rate
The assumption of unrestricted external asset trade is now abandoned.
Under the regime of capital controls postulated here, domestic residents
can neither buy nor sell bonds abroad, and any foreign exchange earnings
must be converted immediately into domestic money at the central bank. A
domestic bond market continues to operate, and, as before, home bonds are
perfect substitutes for claims on foreigners making up a pool b of
"investment currency" that the home public is allowed to hold.
The central hank now buys and sells foreign exchange for commercial
purposes only, pegging the commercial exchange rate (initially at E).
* Thissufficesto pegthehome price level at EP .Becausethecentral hank—10—
does not intervene in the investment currency market, the stock of foreign
bonds b held by the public is fixed. The real price of such bonds, q, need
*
nolonger equal the world price, q ,andcan be thought of as a dual,
financial exchange rate. Correspondingly, the domestic real interest rate
p =(r+)/qcan differ from the world rate p. Both q and p will be deter-
mined endogenously in the model developed in this section.
Capital—account restrictions have several major effects on the func-
tioning of the economy. First, while individuals can still borrow or lend,
the private sector cannot in theaggregatealter its net claims on
foreigners. Second, while individuals can instantaneously alter their
money holdings, the domestic real money supply is, in the aggregate, a pre-
determined variable. Third, the economy as a whole (i.e., the private sec-
tor plus authorities) can alter its net foreign asset position over time
through balance—of—payments disequilibria (which under capital immobility
correspond to current—account disequilibria); hut in this process, the
central bank acts as an intermediary for the domestic public, acquiring
foreign bonds when the public desires growing real balances and decumu—
lating reserves in the opposite case. Fourth, the divergence (noted above)
between the domestic equilibrium real interest rate p and the rate
available to the central hankintroducesa new distortion into the
economy.8As we shall see, this distortion may result in an economy with
multiple stationary positions, some of them unstable.
The representative individual' s problem is now to maximize V [given by— 11—
(1)]subject to the constraint
f(c+Pm)exp(_fPds)dtm0+q0b0+f(y+T)exP(_Jpds)dt,
(13)
where is the expected real interest rate path.
Differentiation of a Lagrangian expression analogous to (5) yields the
necessary conditions
u(ct,mt) =X0exp(&—fpds), (14)
u(ct,mt) =X0p exp(t —fp5ds), (15)
for all t. It is clear from (14) and (15) that consumption and real balan-
ces need no longer be constant over time.
Because the financial exchange rate is endogenous, it is difficult to
derive an explicit, closed—form characterization of the economy's
equilibrium as in the previous section. A diagrammatic approach is there-
fore adopted here. Differentiation of (14) yields the relationship
=u(c,m)(
— (16)
according to which utility "capital gains" on wealth must match any excess
of the subjective discount rate over the real rate of return. By (15),
(16) can be written
+ U(c,mt)n
=uc(ct,mt)6_u(c,mt). (17)
If a m + qb denotes real marketable assets, the identity linking—12--
asset accumulation to saving is9
=y+ rb + Tt + —
Ct. (18)
Substituting the government budget constraint (3) and the central—hank
balance—sheet relation (4) into (18), one obtains:
+ =y+ rb + p* [m —(D0/P)]
—c (19)
In perfect—foresight equilibrium, it is also true that b =bfor all t, so
that b =0 for all t.In equilibrium, then, (19') imolies that the evolution
t
of real balances is governed by the equation
=y+ r + p*{m (1oI1)] —c. (20)







By (16), (20), and (21), a stationary state (q, in, c) of the economy is
defined by the relations
q =r/, (22)
C =y+ rb + p*[rn —(D0/P)], (23)
u(c,m)/u(c,m) = (24)
(recall the definition of p as (r+4)/q). It is assumed henceforth that at
least one stationary state exists.
Equations (20) and (21) together define a complete dynamic system in
real balances and consumption: the dual exchange rate q enters neither
equation. It follows that co—movements in m and c may be analyzed diagram——13—
matically without reference to movements in q. The paths of the two former
variables do affect that of q, however, for equation (16) may be integrated
to yield
u (c ,m )
q=f {c(t r exp(—t) dt
oc0,0
t
=Jrexp (—fp ds) dt. (25)
0 0
According to (25), the real financial exchange rate has two equivalent
interpretations. First, as in constnption—based models of asset pricing
(e.g., Grossman and Shiller [1981]), q is an integral of future physical
yields, weighted by marginal rates of substitution between present and
future consumption and discounted at the subjective time preference rate.
Second, q may be thought of as an integral of future physical yields
discounted by market real interest rates.
III. Dynamics
To analyze the dynamics of real balances and consumption, it is con-
venient initially to linearize the system consisting of (20) and (21) in
the neighborhood of a stationary state. There is no guarantee, however,
that the steady state (if it exists) is unique. The easiest way to see
this is to graph equation (23), which gives long—run consumption as a
function of long—run central—bank reserves, together with (24), the Engel
curve associated with the price 6. Because (23) ——alsothe locus along
which i=0 ——definesan upward—sloping line, the Engel curve may intersect
it several times even when both goods are normal, as in figure 1.(Figure
1 also shows that there could easily be no stationary state.) Of course





earlier monetary—approach literature, the =O locus is horizontal atc =
y+rb > 0, and normality of both goods ensures the existence of a unique
long—run equilibrium.
While one could rule out multiple stationary states under certain
assumptions (e.g., homothetic preferences), there is no compelling reason
for doing so. The following section will analyze devaluation from both the
local and global perspectives.
Let tn and c be stationary levels of real balances and consumption. The









wherefunctions beneath overbars are evaluated at (rn,c). The condition for
saddle—path stability of (26) is that the system have real characteristic
roots of opposite sign. M the determinant of the matrix in (26) is the







Figure 2 displays the phase portrait of (26) under the assumption that
(27) holds. The stability assumption implies that the slope of the r=Q
locus is positive, exceeding that of the ii=0 locus, as shown. It is
assumed that, given an initial level of real balances, the equilibriumcon—







Inequality (27) has a straightforward interpretation. The left—hand
side of the inequality is just the slope of an Engel curve suchas that
pictured in figure 1. The inequality thus states that no stable trajectory
will exist unless an increase in real balances induces an increase incon-
sumption exceeding the world interest rate p. The logic of this condition
is evident. Suppose there is a current—account (i.e., balance—of—payments)
surplus. An increase tm in real balances is associated with an increase
q*f in central—bank foreign reserves and hence an increase in
national income. Because real balances are a normal good, the rise in
income induces a further rise in desired real balances, and unless absorp—
* tionis rising faster than national income (i.e., unless tc >p tn), the
current account surplus will widen over time rather than shrink. Figure 3
depicts a stationary position around which (27) does not hold.'°
The foregoing discussion implies an easy saddle—path stability cri-
terion for the multiple stationary states shown in figure 1. Bcause the
i=O locus has slope p, any point at which the Engel curve cuts it from
beLj is a saddle point. Similarly, any point at which the Engel curve
cuts the ri=O locus from above is an unstable stationary state. Figure 4
shows an example of a dynamic system with several stationary states.
Note that the Engel curve coincides with the global =O locus only when the
instantaneous utility function is separable in consumption and real balan-
ces (u=O).
There are obviously several potential pathologies. For example, if the
=0locus first intersects the ii= 0locus from above, there is no
convergent equilibrium to the left of the first (i.e., lowest real—balance)







from above at its last intersection, there is no convergent equilibrium to
the right of the last (i.e., highest real—balance) steady state. To rule
out these cases, I assume that for every real—balance level, there exists a
value of consumption placing the economy on a stable trajectory.'' The
usual sufficient conditions imply that these stable paths are equilibria
for the economy.
Using (25), it is easy to describe.the behavior of the dual exchange
rate q along a convergent path. When the balance of payments is in defi-
cit, say, consumption is high relative to its ultimate level, and the
marginal utility of consumption is low. Thus, q exceeds its long—run level
q =r/S, and, by (25) ,fallstoward it as the economy converges to external
equilibrium. This heuristic argument indicates that a deficit is accom-
panied by a falling (or appreciating) financial exchange rate, and a
surplus by a rising (or depreciating) rate. An appendix presents a
rigorous proof of the proposition.12
IV. Nonneutral Devaluation
The preceding apparatus may be used to demonstrate that when central—
bank reserves earn interest and there are no private capital movements,
devaluation alters the economy's long—run equilibrium. This section first
analyzes the effect of a small, unanticipated devaluation when the economy
is initially at a saddle—path stable stationary equilibrium. The result of
the experiment is always a balance—of—payments surplus that leads to a rise
in long—run consumption and real balances. A global analysis of deva-
luation yields essentially the same outcome. Even when there are multiple
equilibria, a large devaluation can never leap—frog an unstable sta-
tionary state and cause a balance—of—payments deficit.—17—
Consider first the local analysis of a small, unanticipated devaluation
on the assumption that the economy is initially at a stable long—run
equilibrium (rn,c) such as that shown in figure 2. A change in the exchange
rate (to E' from E) generally shifts both the ti=O and the O loci, for
this policy action alters the balance—sheet relation linking the real money
stock and the stock of foreign reserves. By (4) and (12), the post—
devaluation equations of motion for the economy are
y + r + p m— (D0/P) + —c
, (28)




where again, E (E'—E)/E' and in is the pre—devaluation real—balance level.
Near (rn,c), the vertical shift of the ifi=O locus is
dc — — = p*m>O
uC m=O







If the =O schedule shifts downward, long—run consumption and real balances
necessarily rise. But long—run consumption and real balances rise also if
the =O schedule shifts upward, for
— — — — mp* ) > 0.
dc iO de
Figure5 shows the impact and long—run effects of a small unanticipated
devaluation for the case in which the =0 locus shifts upward. Because the






















consumption falls in the short run. Corresponding to the public's desire
to rebuild its real balances is a balance—of—payments surplus. As real
balances rise over time, however, central—bank reserves rise, and because
these earn interest at rate p*, national income grows as well. At the new
long—run equilibrium (m' ,c'),consumption and real money demand are there—
13 fore higher than before the devaluation.
Section Ill's results imply that the dual exchange rate q is also
affected by the devaluation. The sudden reduction in real wealth reduces
private demand for foreign bonds; equilibrium requires a fall in their
price and a depreciating financial exchange rate. Over time, expectations
are fulfilled as q rises toward r/. In the short run, therefore, an unan-
ticipated devaluation causes the real interest rate to rise.
The preceding results were derived using "local" arguments. Must the
conclusions be modified when large devaluations are considered? It turns
out that no modification is needed: a large devaluation can never lead to
a long—run decline in consumption and real balances.
Figure 6, which combines the consumer's Engel curve with the ifi=O locus,
is used to make this point. If initial real balances at the stable
equilibrium A are m, devaluation reduces them to (1—c)rn, and also shifts
the i=O schedule leftward by m. The Engel curve's position does not
change.
The economy will now travel to one of the two stationary positions clo-
sest to C, labelled B and D in figure 6. But B must be the stable
equilibrium,as shown: with both goods normal, the Engel curve cannot cut
i'=Ofrom above between Cand B and still pass through A, the initial posi-













the closest to the right is stable.It follows again that the short—run
result of devaluation is a fall in consumption and a balance—of—payments
surplus. Ultimately, real balances and consumption rise above their origi—
14 nal values as the central bank accumulates foreign reserves.
V. Conclusion
This paper has re—examined the effect of devaluation when there are
capital—account restrictions, adding to traditional formulations the
realistic assumption that central—bank reserves earn interest. In an
intertemporal model, devaluation is no longer neutral in the long run as it
is in the monetary—approach literature. Further, the economy may possess
multiple long—run equilibria, some of them unstable.
The analysis confirms, however, that even a large devaluation must
improve the balance of payments if the economy is initially at a stable
stationary position. A by—product of the analysis is a pricing formula for
the financial exchange rate in a dual exchange rate system. That formula
is consistent with recent consumption—based models of asset pricing.
Appendix
This appendix proves that in the neighborhood of a stable steady state,
a balance—of—payments surplus is accompanied by a rising (or depreciating)
financial exchange rate q and a deficit by a falling (or appreciating)
rate. To see this, linearize the model around a long—run equilibrium
(q, in, C),definedby (22)—(24). By (14) and (15), u(c,m)/u(c,m) =
Pt
=(r+i)/q
,sothat the dynamics of q are governed by
={[u(c,m)/u (ct,mt)] —(rIq)}q
.—20—












If stability condition (27) is assumed, the foregoing system has two
positive characteristic roots (one of which is 5) and one negative root.
Let 0 denote the negative root, and=
tii)acharacteristic vector
belonging to 0. The saddle—path equilibrium of the economy is written as
—= (w11w2)(m0— )exp(Ot),
—rn=(in0 — ) exp(Ut),
c —= (w3/2)(m0—) exp(Ot).








Becausew31w2 =—0> 0, consumption and real balances rise or fall
together during the transition to a stable long—run equilibrium (as the
diagrams in the text showed). To establish that q rises during a surplus
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Thus Ui/w2isCpositiveif and only if
p* — +(&_p*)> —0(— 6) (Al) ccmm cm cm cc




and u—c5u>0 ,(Al)is equivalent to cm cc





>( p*+ — +cm
— mm]}l/2 () 2 u—ôu 4 u cm cc cc
Squaring both (positive) sides of (A2) yields an inequality which,, after
some manipulation, can be shown to be equivalent to
u u —u2>0 . (A3) ccmm cm
But (A3) is true because the instantaneous utility function is strictly
concave. Thus > 0, as was to be demonstrated.—22—
Footnotes
*
Thispaper was written while the author was a visitor at the Department of
Economics, Tel—Aviv University. Financial support from the National
Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
1. Descriptive models of two—tier exchange—rate systems are developed by
Flood [19781 ,Marion[19811 ,Aizenman[19831 ,Kiguel[1983] ,andCumby
[1984] .Calvo[1979] presents a related model in which nonreproducible
"land plays the role of foreign assets under capital controls. Adams and
Greenwood [1983] use a two—period optimizing model to study a regime in
which the authorities intervene to fix both the commerical and financial
exchange rates.
2. The neutrality result established in this section is not sensitive to
the particular preference setup adopted. Obstfeld [19811 gives an example
of devaluation neutrality under time—inseparable tastes.
3. The assumption S=p is made only to ensure the existence of a non—
degenerate stationary equilibrium for the economy; see, for exarñple,
Obstfeld and Stockman [1984] ,section5.1. It should be clear, however,
that devaluation is neutral in the present model when The assumption
&p* is relaxed in the following sections.
4. Because there is a single representative individual, the individual's
net holding of domestically—issued bonds is zero.
5. In a more general forniu1ation, D0 would would reflect also past deva-
luations (as discussed below) and past changes in q*.
6. Of course if central—bank reserves f were negative ——implyingpast
official borrowing to support the exchange rate ——thecentral bank would—23—
not have a choice about paying interest (barring default). In this case,
according to (3), the public would be taxed to meet official debt—service
obligations.
7. Typically the central bank creates a fictitious non—monetary accounting
liability instead.
8. There is already a distortion in the economy, even under capital mobi-
lity, because the private opportunity cost of real balances is positive and
thus exceeds the zero marginal cost at which money can be provided by the
central bank.
9. The following equation reflects the assumption that interest payments
onforeign bonds are repatriated at the commercial exchange rate.
10. Models based on intertemporal optimization typically imply the
existence of a convergent saddle path. That implication cannot be obtained
here because of the interest—rate distortion. Descriptive models of exter-
nal asset accumulation typically need to assume a stability condition like
(27), however. For a discussion, see Obstfeld and Stockman [1984], section 4.1.
11. Tangencies are also excluded by assumption.
12. This result also emerges from the descriptive literature cited in foot-
note 1.
13. Clearly a decrease in the money supply would have a similar long—run
impact. Monetary policy (like devaluation) is therefore nonneutral in the
present model.
14. A natural question is whether a devaluation has similar effects when
the economy is out of long—run equilibrium. It appears that devaluation,
in this case, may improve or worsen the balance of payments on impact.
However, arguments similar to that in the preceding paragraph suggest that— 24—
thelong—run equilibrium attained after a devaluation is characterized by
higher consimiption and real balances than would have been attained in the
absence of devaluation.—25—
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